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SOME ENDURING MISCONCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
SAMUEL KRISLOVt
H. L. Mencken has bequeathed us a savagely brilliant account about
his fathering a history of the bathtub in the United States. To relieve
the strain of the war days he concocted "a tissue of absurdities" detailing
such events as the alleged first use of the bathtub in the White House by
Fillmore. These patent fabrications were to his amazement quickly can-
onized to fact, and to this day, in spite of repeated exposures of the hoax,
standard works often cite these figments as reproductions of reality.'
Mencken's experience assuredly was not unique; the experiences of Ben-
jamin Franklin, particularly with regard to his account of Polly Baker,
were so similar as to exclude coincidence.2 Basic human characteristics
are involved in man's creation of a fictional universe.
The process of mythology is, in short, a never-ending and an in-
evitable one. It has a close analogue in the mechanisms of diffusion of
rumor, and this has been closely studied so that we can understand the
motivations behind the process. These mechanisms have been analyzed
as basically involving a drive toward simplification of elements and the
creation of an image consistent with the total structure of the rest of
"reality" as experienced by the individual. So, as Gordon Allport has
shown in his familiar study, a picture of a white man shaving on a sub-
way in the presence of a Negro is transferred in the course of successive
transmission into the stereotyped and "simplified" situation of a Negro
threatening the white man with a razor.3
That these processes are both basic and non-trivial seems to be borne
out by their replication in higher intellectual forms of endeavor. Thus
the well-known scientific principle of "Occam's Razor" insist on the utili-
t Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University.
1. MENcKEN, THE GREAT BATHTUB HOAX (1958). As to the remarkable history
of the hoax see the advertisement of the World Book Encyclopedia Company, Saturday
Rev., June 13, 1953, which reports over fifty references found by its researchers to the
Fillmore "incident."
2. See M. HALL, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND POLLY BAKER (1960); and see also
X WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 121 (Ford ed. 1899).
3. ALLPORT & POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 71-73 (1947). Compare
Scheerer, Cognitive Theory in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Lindzey ed. 1954).
Allport discusses three basic processes; "leveling," "sharpening," and "association."
These compare with the two concepts of "simplification" and "striving after meaning,"
which are to be found in the gently honest and brilliant study by BARTLETT, REMEMBERING(1937), and which serve as the point of departure for Allport.
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zation of the "simplest" explanation in scientific work, as well as the con-
cept that embraces the most data consistently: "do not multiply entities
without reason." Similarly, it is the basic insistence upon and the neces-
sity for interrelationships in the form of abstract theories which is prob-
ably the dominant characteristic of modern science.4
In the face of these seminal drives and processes, it is nonetheless
the function of scholarship to attempt to cut through myths, to present
the past in its complexity, eschewing oversimplification where possible,
and constantly re-examining its findings and conclusions. The consti-
stitutional historian, in particular, faces severe problems in serving this
aim.
American constitutional history has always been the product of po-
litical struggles and scholarship aimed at vindicating some past or present
ideological issue. In this sense, it is the heir of repeated and cumulative
error. No doubt we remain victims of present-day illusions every bit as
limiting and mischievous in their effects as those of former years, but
perhaps some of those which have burdened us in the past can be re-
examined and discarded. It is the purpose of this article to examine
several such historical claims in their genetic backgrounds, with some
hope of clarification of the issues involved.
I. THE MYTH OF THE NON-DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC
For most of the twentieth century, it has been fashionable for both
Progressives and Conservatives to question the bona fides of American
democracy. The Founding Fathers, it is argued, rejected democracy,
which to them signalized anarchic mob rule. The Progressives' model of
the undemocratic origin of American government was apparently con-
structed upon the assumption that the Constitution per se had by the
1890 's become an obstacle to progress-that liberal ferment could be fos-
tered only through popular disillusion with the prevailing constitutional
worship. The Progressives thus argued that the supposed anti-democratic
origin of the Constitution invalidated any claim to legitimacy and venera-
tion by a majoritarian society.
This is the underlying thesis of J. Allen Smith's work, as well as
Charles Beard's An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States,' a book which clearly follows the spirit of Smith's Te
4. See, e.g., COHEN & NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD
(1934).
5. BEARD, AN EcONOMIc INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1913). The Beard thesis has been sharply under attack ever since its inception,
and in recent years it has been thoroughly demolished. The work of Robert Brown is
discussed and evaluated in Hofstadter, On Reading the Constitution Anew, in BURxHART,
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Spirit of American Government.' Perhaps the dearest statement of the
Progressive argument, aside from the implications of the conspiracy
theory developed in the Economic Interpretation, is to be found in Beard's
later work, The Republic,' which is considerably more kindly in its im-
putations of intention on the part of the Founding Fathers.
Drawing upon a lifetime of research, Beard still concluded that
democracy was not popular among the majority of the delegates at the
Constitutional Convention, and "until well into the nineteenth century
the word was repeatedly used by conservatives to smear opponents of
all kinds." So far as he could find, Beard reported that Jefferson, Madi-
son and Jackson never used the word in public papers nor called them-
selves at any time democrats.'
This essentially muck-raking position developed by the Progressives
in the early part of the century is currently utilized in the main for quite
opposite purposes by quite divergent political groupings. The extreme
Right today accepts the Progressive conclusion of the anti-democratic
tenor of the government instituted by the 1789 Constitution, and draws
from this the conclusion that any currently existing democracy in conse-
quence represents a departure from the true principles that ought to gov-
ern American life. While the Progressives utilize the present to indict
the past, the Rightists would use the past to inhibit the future.
A sample of this avowedly reactionary position is to be found in the
work of E. Merrill Root, Professor of English Literature at Earlham
College, who has specialized in critical treatment of the modern educa-
tional system. In his most recent indictment, Brainwashing in the High
Schools, he insisted categorically that "our American form of govern-
ment is not a 'democracy' at all."'  His examination of textbooks in
American history utilized in the high schools finds all of them at fault
in that they "fall to clarify the fact that the United States is not a de-
mocracy, but a constitutional republic." He then describes what he con-
siders to be a concerted effort "to shunt it onto the track called democ-
racy."1 Chapter 3 of his work is devoted entirely to an examination and
BUSH, KRiSLOV & LEE, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: THE CLASH OF ISSUES (1960). Mr.
Brown's exhaustive line-by-line critique of Beard and his portrait of a relatively un-
stratified middle-class society in the Colonial era, derived from painstaking research, has
now been supplemented by a trenchant and systematic critique of the essential method
of Beard. The work McDoNALD, WE THE PEOPLE (1958) will stand as a model of sys-
tematic historical treatment for some time. But see BENSON, TURNER AND BEARD:
AMERICAN HISTORICAL WRITING RECONSIDERED (1960) for a different evaluation.
6. J. ALLEN SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1907).
7. BEARD, THE REPUBLIC (1943).
8. Id. at 30-31.
9. ROOT, BRAINWASHING IN THE HIGH SCHOOLS 28 (1959).
10. Id. at 31.
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discussion of this thesis, which is, indeed, a most familiar one.
Yet the point, if familiar, is also an overdone one, stretched far be-
yond any real evidence. Governeur Morris, at the Convention, did, of
course, maintain that the "evils we experience flow from the excess of
democracy," and Hamilton condemned the "violence and turbulence of
the democratic spirit."" Madison, however, in terms similar to those
used in Federalist X, spoke of a need for an extended country, since "this
was the only defense agst the inconveniences of democracy consistent
with the democratic form of govt [sic],' '12 while Wilson insisted that the
majority ought to bind the rest of society."
The Virginia Debates on the Constitution certainly emphasized the
democratic spirit, with Lee and Pendleton outvying each other in claim-
ing the Constitution to be an egalitarian document. 4 This was climaxed
by John Marshall's assertion that "we, sir, idolize democracy. Those
who oppose it have bestowed eulogies on monarchy. We prefer this sys-
tem to any monarchy, because we are convinced it has greater tendency
to secure our liberty and promote our happiness. We admire it because
we think it a well-regulated democracy." 5
The congressional discussion over the Bill of Rights had similar, if
somewhat more mixed, connotations. A proposal to empower the people
to instruct the representatives as a provision of the Bill of Rights was
made by Tucker. Jennifer Stone of Maryland objected. "I think the
clause would change the Government entirely; instead of being a Govern-
ment founded upon representation, it would be a democracy of singular
properties."' 6  Gerry was to challenge this assertion:
There was one remark which escaped him, when he was up be-
fore. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Stone) had said
that the amendment would change the nature of the government,
and make it a democracy. Now he had always heard that it was
a democracy; but perhaps he was misled, and the honorable
gentleman was right in distinguishing it by some other appella-
tion; perhaps an aristocracy was a term better adapted to it.'7
Page also argued along the same lines. He found that "all power vests
11. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN
STATES 125, 221 (1927).
12. Id. at 162.
13. Id. at 373.
14. 3 EimoTT's DEBATES 272, 295 (2d ed. 1838).
15. Id. at 222.
16. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 739 (1789).
17. Id. at 742-43. A few moments later Gerry added the observation that the heat
had heightened the acrimony of the debate, which perhaps explains his strong reaction
to Stone's rather qualified statements. Id. at 748.
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in the people of the United States; it is, therefore, a Government of the
people, a democracy.""
It does not necessarily follow that the rejection of the proposed
amendment constituted a denial of Page's and Gerry's description of the
government as a government of the people. Madison's statement that he
did not wish to disturb the principles of government 9 would seem to be
more properly understood as a factual statement of the consequences of
the power to instruct representatives, rather than a response to the dis-
cussions on the word "democracy" which, indeed, Madison's remarks do
not closely follow. Even Stone, a point Gerry overlooked, condemned
only the creation of a democracy of "singular properties."
While it is true that Jefferson avoided use of the term "democrat"
publicly, the import of this seems to have been somewhat exaggerated.
He was an infrequent utilizer of the term in private correspondence, but
invoked it in a favorable context when he employed it. On those rare
occasions, too, he showed no self-consciousness in equating "republican"
and "democratic," defining "republican" in terms of majority control
that, if anything, were more sweeping than any currently conventional
definitions of democracy. "A nation," he wrote in 1788, "ceases to be
republican . . .when the will of the majority ceases to be the law"-and
this conviction was carried to the point where "I readily suppose my
opinion wrong when opposed by the majority.""0
In short, there does not appear to have been any established, con-
sistently derogatory usage of the term during the early period of the re-
public. The contrary impression would seem to be the product of the
Federalist Papers, which do counterpoise the terms "republic" and "de-
mocracy" to the disadvantage of the latter. Even here, however, we find
that the discussion of the terms was in a specific context-namely, in-
volving a contradiction of "pure" democracy as a form of government to
a representative republic. In the further discussions the term "pure"
then tended to be omitted, as in Federalist X, XIV, andLXIII, apparently
for ease of discussion. 2 This usage is supported by Madison's letter to
18. Id. at 744.
19. Id. at 747.
20. See Palmer, Notes on the Use of the Word "Democracy" 1789-1799, POL. ScI.Q. 203 (1953), typical of the exaggerations of Jefferson's antipathy. Compare with
Jefferson's letters, to James Madison, IV THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSONr 479(Ford ed. 1787); to David Humphreys, V WRITINGS 90 (Ford ed. 1789) ; and to Dr.
William Eustis, IX WRITINGS 236 (Ford ed. 1809).
21. See Modem Library Edition, FEDERALIST X 58-59, as contrasted with pp. 60-61
and F ;DFRJATIST XIV 8, Se€ aIso 1:DFRELST I.-*1I 4-1,
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Jefferson of October 24, 1787,22 another anticipation of the Federalist
discussion, which equates a "simple Democracy or a pure Republic."
This special usage seems confirmed by the case of Joseph Dennie in
1805 in Pennsylvania."3 The facts involved indicate sharply that writers
have not properly conveyed the standing of the word "democracy" as a
popular symbol in our early history. Dennie had written an article de-
rogatory of democracy and had been accused of seditious libel. The
article had been phrased in quite general terms with no concrete refer-
ences to existing systems or governments. He wrote that:
A democracy is scarcely tolerable at any period of national his-
tory. It was weak and wicked at Athens, it was bad in Sparta,
and worse in Rome . . . The institution of a scheme of polity
so radically contemptible and vicious, is a memorable example
of what the villainy of some men can devise, the folly of others
receive, and both establish in despite of reason, reflection, and
sensation.2"
Though 1803, when these words were written, hardly can be said to be
"well into the 19th century," the case was not treated as a simple expres-
sion of epithets, but as, at least potentially, a grievous attack upon both
the State and National Governments, though neither were mentioned spe-
cifically by Dennie. His eventual acquittal did not hinge upon any sup-
posed inapplicability of the term to American governments, but rather
upon the legitimacy of philosophic discussion of political systems as op-
posed to specific advocacy of action-a distinction curiously anticipatory
of the opinion in Yates v. United States.2 The Pennsylvania Court ap-
proved "temperate investigations of the nature and forms of govern-
ment," and contrasted them with writings "plainly accompanied with a
criminal intent, deliberately designed to unloosen the social band of
union, totally to unhinge the minds of the citizens, and to produce popular
discontent with the exercise of power, by the known constituted
authorities."2
22. I WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 350-51 (1867). The admirable discussion in
Palmer, supra note 20, has little on the American situation, but pp. 224-25 contain noth-
ing contrary to this interpretation, and the material from Paine is in agreement.
23. Respublica Against Dennie, 4 Yeates 267 (Pa. 1805).
24. Dennie on April 23, 1803, Respublica Against Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 268-69(Pa. 1805). "Among their writers, Dennie, the editor of the Portfolio, who was a kind
of oracle with them, and styled the Addison of America, openly avowed his preference
of monarchy over all other forms of government, prided himself on the avowal, and
maintained it by argument freely and without reserve, in his publications." X WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 334 (Ford ed. 1825).
25. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
26. Respublica Against Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 269 (Pa. 1805).
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The Court found the day "long past" when seditious libel was to be
utilized to prevent criticism. "The enlightened advocates of representa-
tive republican government pride themselves in the reflection, that the
more deeply their system is examined, the more fully will the judgments
of honest men be satisfied .. ."" The Court felt Dennie's comments
could be innocent if meant either as a philosophical discussion of democ-
racy generally, "or that the censures on democracy were bestowed on
pure unmixed democracy,"28 and in this sense were not discussions of the
American system.
In general, it is clear that the Court assumed that the terms "de-
mocracy" and "representative republican government" were usually sy-
nonymous, although there was a sense in which they were sometimes, for
special purposes, distinguished. The case also demonstrates that if de-
mocracy was unpopular in some circles in the formative years, it also had
vast public support as an appropriate term for the system of government.
If some individuals used "democrat" as an epithet "well into the 19th
century," it would appear they even ran the risks of prosecution for such
usage.
No doubt the distinction was popularly made between absolute ma-
jority dominance in face-to-face communities and the existing system of
government, but this distinction was not extrapolated into a defense of
minority rule nor of a denial of majority supremacy. The distinction
between a pure democracy and a republic was one accepted way of deal-
ing with the dichotomy, but A. T. Mason's formulation of a difference
between "popular government" and "free government"29 is probably a
superior formulation of the distinction. In any event, the supposedly
unfavorable connotations of the term have been, it is clear, at best
exaggerated.
II. THE RECURRENT INCLUSION OF THE WORD "ExPRESSLY" IN THE
TENTH AMENDMENT
Probably the most persistent error in all our constitutional history
is the continuous misstatement of the wording of the tenth amendment.
In spite of the precise, yet polemical, statement of the Court in United
States v. Darby,"9 the error has not disappeared. Justice Stone, in the
Darby case, took great pains to provide a thorough account of the histori-
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 270 (Emphasis added.).
29. MAsoN, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 140 (1958).
30. "The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of the amendment to suggest'. that
its purpose was other than to allay fears." 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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cal context of the adoption and wording of the amendment. In spite
of this, the amendment is constantly reamended in popular discussion and
controversy, with the ghost word "expressly" (purposely omitted in the
amendment's enactment) continuously reintroduced into the text. In
former years, however, it was even similarly utilized in judicial decisions,
though Justice Story had in his Commentaries provided a similar and ex-
acting statement of its history."
Part of this peculiar survival is sheer historical persistence. The
tenth amendment clearly owes its origin to Article II of the Articles of
Confederation, which provided that: "Each state retains its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right,
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United
States, in Congress assembled.
3 2
The lack of a similar provision in the original Constitution provoked
considerable discussion at the state ratifying conventions. Massachu-
setts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island all called for
an amendment which would have limited the powers of the national gov-
ernment to those "expressly" granted, while New York somewhat more
generously would have allowed circumspection of the national govern-
ment only to those "clearly" granted.33 Virginia, however, considered
such a proposed restriction and rejected it. 4
When Madison pressed for a Bill of Rights during the months of
May through July of 1789, he proffered the present form of the tenth
amendment sans the word "expressly." Successive efforts to reinclude
31. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1907-
08, p. 652 (5th ed. 1891). "The attempts which have been made from time to time to
force upon this language an abridging or restrictive influence are utterly unfounded ...
Stripped of ingenious disguises in which they are clothed they are neither more nor
less than attempts to foist onto the text the word 'expressly.'"
32. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, op. cit. supra note 11, at 27.
33. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1018 (Mass.), 1025 (N.H.),
1052, 1056 (R.I.), which last state utilizes the term "clearly" in the text as a rule of
construction, and "expressly" in the form of the suggested amendment. South Carolina
(Id. at 1025) suggests the limitation as a rule of construction. In Maryland a com-
mittee considered proposed amendments and recommended some fifteen amendments,
including a proposal limiting congressional powers to those "expressly" granted. How-
ever, they did not feel the Maryland convention the proper forum for consideration
of the amendments, and the convention upheld this position. The minority later issued
these and other rejected amendments as an Anti-Federalist document. See RUTLAND,
THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 154-55 (1955). The account in Feller, The Tenth
Amendment Retires, 27 A.B.A.J. 223, 224 n.14 (1941), is misleading with regard to
Maryland. On the action of New York, see DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, op. cit. Srupra
note 11, at 1035. North Carolina would have prohibited Congress from exercising
powers "not by this Constitution delegated." Id. at 1047.
34. On Virginia see DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, op. Cit. supra note 11, at 1027-34,
esp. 1031. Madison on the floor of Congress commented on the consideration in the
Virginia Convention and the decision not to include the term. See I ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS 761.
202
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the vital term were made three times-by Tucker and Gerry in the House,
as well as once in the Senate. All failed.35
In the face of this direct and repeated rejection of the term, how-
ever, efforts of various kinds were persistently made to reinclude it. The
word seemed to spring to the lips so naturally; the sense of the amend-
ment seems to cry out for such closure. Without such an absolute
qualifier the tenth amendment reduces itself to a logical tautology, as
legalists from Story to Stone have pointed out. The interpolation of the
word "expressly" thus has a psychological motive-a desire to impute
meaning and an unwillingness to accept any barrenness of so dignified
and superficially momentous a provision. When this was coupled with
obvious political motives and questions of political advantage, a potent
force was indeed created.
Almost instantaneously-indeed prior to the actual ratification of
the amendment-the revival of the old restrictions was attempted. In
the course of the Virginia struggle against the Assumption Act in 1790
opponents of Hamilton's fiscal policies were moved to formal protest.
In a brilliant state paper of remonstrance, which Beveridge calls "the
Magna Charta of States' Rights," the Anti-Federalist majority asserted
that "during the whole discussion of the federal Constitution by the con-
vention of Virginia, your memorialists were taught to believe 'that every
power not expressly granted was retained' . . . and upon this positive
condition""5 only had the Constitution been acceptable and been approved.
Here was the first formal assertion of absolute construction by the
legislature of the very state whose convention had rejected such a re-
strictive wording in recommending the adoption of the tenth amendment
not two years previous. This, said Hamilton, "is the first symptom of a
spirit which must either be killed or it will kill the Constitution of the
United States."' 7
The further diffusion of this new reading of the amendment is
probably traceable to Jefferson's writings, notably in the Kentucky Reso-
lutions. There he asserts that "it is true as a general principle, and is
also expressly declared by one of the amendments to the Constitution""8
35. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 761, 767-78. See also DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 41-42 (1957). During the course of his appeal
for its adoption Tucker argued that the inclusion of the word would not be tightly
restrictive.
36. The Resolution is to be found, together with an analysis and discussion, in
II BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL ch. 2 (1916), esp. pp. 66-70.
37. Hamilton to Jay, November 13, 1790, IX WORIS OF ALEXANDER HAMILToN
473-74 (Lodge ed. 1886).
38. The Kentucky Resolutions, November 16, 1798 (Emphasis added); text re-
printed in SMITH & MURPHY, LIBERTY AND JUSTIcE; A HISTORIcAL REcoRD OFAm-
cAN CoNSTITuTi ONAL DEVELOPMENT 100-04 (1958).
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that powers not delegated are reserved to the states. This peculiar juxta-
position of "expressly" and the tenth amendment appears twice in the
Resolutions. The interpolation of the word into the substantive portions
of the sentence was to proceed from these beginnings, buttressed as they
were by memories of the Articles of Confederation.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Luther Martin urged the amendment as
a substantive limitation upon the granted powers of the federal govern-
ment, only to have Marshall take judicial cognizance of the form of the
amendment:
[T]here is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles
of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and
which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and
minutely described. Even the 10th [sic] amendment, which was
framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies
which had been excited, omits the word "expressly" . . . .
Similar observations by Story and Madison emphasize that the tenth
amendment was seen contemporaneously as a "tub to the whale," and, in
Madison's own terms, "superfluous." 4
Only fourteen years later, however, a divergent note was sounded in
United States v. Hudson and Goodwin.4 In what was probably the
greatest Democratic-Republican judicial victory of the era, the Court
through William Johnson ruled against the existence of common law
federal crimes. In the course of his decision, justice Johnson observed
that "the powers of the general Government are made up of concessions
from the several states-whatever is not expressly given to the former,
the latter expressly reserve... ."' This observation, oddly enough,
was not to be picked up in later judicial decisions, and remains a solecism;
dual federalism was to find its texts elsewhere and in another era.
Half a century later, in Lane County v. Oregon,48 Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase was to comment along similar lines. In ruling that the
Legal Tender Acts did not require a state to accept the paper currency
established as legal tender for the payment of state taxes, Chase asserted
more than just that the states existed before the Constitution. The
states were prior to the Union also, in the sense of possessing the potential
of existence without the national government, while the latter was de-
39. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819). Luther
Martin, at 374, in the course of argument advanced the proposition that the national
government had only express powers.
40. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 457-58.
41. United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 32 (1812).
42. Id. at 33 (Emphasis added.)
43. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869).
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pendent in its processes upon the existence of the states. But this was
not the ultimate; more directly Chase continued: "To them and to the
people all powers not expressly delegated to the National Government are
reserved.","
Chase's observations on the general nature of the Union did not go
unrecognized; representing virtually the obverse of Lincoln's proposition
that the Union is anterior to the states, his epitome of state-federal rela-
tions became a shibboleth of dual federalism. Similarly, his use of the
tenth amendment became a regular feature of dual federalist decisions.
The standard judicial technique became one of quoting the tenth
amendment, not in terms of its actual wording in the Constitution itself,
but to refer to the tenth amendment and to quote Lane County v. Oregon.
This became almost a bench mark of judicial decisions in derogation of
federal power. The classics that cite Lane County v. Oregon include Col-
lector v. Day, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., and Hammer v.
Dagenhart."5 This judicial sleight-of-hand of quoting one source and
citing another has dazzled observers. So, for example, our greatest con-
stitutional historian, E. S. Corwin, credits Justice Day with having cre-
atively amended the Constitution in Hammer v. Dagenhart, where actu-
ally Day was merely following along by citing Chase's amendations."
This peculiar use of the tenth amendment was rendered all the more
peculiar by the persistence of the more logical and restrictive sense in
treatises and in decisions. So Story's Commentaries remained a check
upon this type of states' rights reasoning. Again, court decisions were
by no means unanimous in expanding the reserved powers. Contempo-
raneously with Lane County v. Oregon a New York court noted that "the
omission of this word in the tenth amendment is most significant, and
shows the object was not to interfere with or restrain any of the powers
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, whether expressly
delegated or not."4  Similarly, Holmes' comments on the "invisible ir-
radiations" of the amendment not limiting the treaty power are paralleled
by emphatic remarks from a surprising source. It was Justice Roberts
who in 1931 observed that: "the Tenth Amendment was intended to con-
firm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was
adopted .... It added nothing to the instrument as originally ratified."4
44. Id. at 76 (Emphasis added.)
45. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124-25 (1871); 157 U.S. 429, 560 (1895); 247 U.S.
251, 275 (1918).
46. See CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 32-33 (1934).
47. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N.Y. 400, 416 (1863), relying on the
discussion in McCulloch v. Maryland.
48. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931).
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So the Judges actually created a dual line of decision of the type
described so well by Corwin and Llewellyn, even with regard to a ques-
tion of historical fact. By 1937 such judicial tactics were no longer
respectable. Finally, in United States v. Darby, the Court speaking
through Justice Stone most emphatically laid to rest the Chase heresy.
It was after that decision that A. H. Feller wrote his article with the
remarkably descriptive title, The Tenth Amendment Retires."
The sole persistence of the old myth is in popular discussion and
controversy. It is a sign of the intellectual weakness of the Southern
segregationist position that even its most effective idealogue, James Kil-
patrick, has chosen to rest his argument on the discredited historical and
logical interpretation of the tenth amendment.5"
III. THE SUPPOSED ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF RECIPROCAL TAX
IMMUNITIES IN MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND
If some things are obscure because hidden, others are yet more un-
known because so familiar. The case of McCulloch v. Maryland" is one
where early and continuous acquaintance makes deeper investigation un-
likely and the early impressions of the case tend to be accepted as mature
findings.
The origins in this case of the doctrine of federal government im-
munity from taxation is well known. The familiar "the power to tax in-
volves the power to destroy"5" still rings through history more fervently
than Holmes' postscript that this was not in fact the case "so long as this
court sits.""8  The logic of Marshall, at least superficially, was strong
and clear. An instrumentality of the federal government could be cre-
ated as a consequence of the implications of the "necessary and proper"
clause; such an agency, if legitimate, was a necessity imputed with all the
attributes of the supremacy of the nation. This, in turn, required free-
dom from the exaction of a portion of the national community. Follow-
ing Marshall's typical mode of interpretation-a power granted, he was
inclined to say, could be exercised to its outmost limit-if the state could
tax, it could thereby control. A state could disagree with the policies of
the national government; it ought not constitutionally to prevail. A
state might benefit materially by taxing aspects of national government
activity and thus, in effect, gain at the expense of the remaining states;
49. 27 A.B.A.J. 223 (1941).
50. KILPATRIcK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES: NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF VIRGINIA (1957).
51. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
52. Id. at 431.
53. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S, 218, 223 (1928).
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the part ought not to be in a position to so aggrandize itself as against
the whole."4
The origins of federal immunity in the case are, indeed, so clear
that there is a strong tendency for writers to leap ahead historically
and to assert that Marshall also delimited the power of the nation to
tax the states. So Fred Rodell, a Yale tax expert, has written that:
Perhaps the best known of those pieces of the Highest Law
of the Land that the court has manufactured out of ethereal
logic with no help at all from the words of the document is
the piece that deals with the federal government taxing the
state governments and vice versa. It all started with Chief
Justice Marshall's famous bromide that "the power to tax
involves the power to destroy." Therefore, argued Marshall,
with his court chiming in, we can't have the states laying taxes
on the property or the activities or the bonds or the employees
of the federal government and we can't have the federal govern-
ment levying taxes on the states either. For if we allowed
such taxes one of our governments might insidiously destroy
the other. 5
Lest there be any ambiguity as to Rodell's view of the origin of state
immunity, he has emphatically and more distinctly suggested the same
in another work. "Marshall," writes Rodell:
[S]aid, in effect, that since the Constitution creates a dual
sovereignty-federal and state-it must mean that neither
sovereign may destroy the legitimate activities of the other....
It was this black-or-white logic . . . that made all the federal
government's operations completely untouchable by state taxes
and vice versa. 6
Somewhat more circumspectly, Bernard Schwartz has suggested
that the principle of state immunity from federal taxation is not ex-
pressly confirmed in McCidloch but can be derived from it. "Implicit
in the Marshall holding," Schwartz has written, "is a broad doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity which protects the states as well as the
federal government. '6 7
Whether put in terms of an exact statement appearing on its face in
54. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 ff. (1819).
55. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS 66-67 (2d ed. 1957).
56. RODELL, NiNE MEN 98 (1955).
57. SCHWVARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN ETRo-
sPEcT 199 (1957).
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McCulloch or as a derivative of the logic of the decision, state immunity
does not seem to have originated there. After all, Marshall not only
did not imply such an immunity, he emphatically and unequivocally
denied it. If such a denial has not found favor in the eyes of the Court
it is not Marshall but his successors who have made that evaluation.
Marshall dealt specifically with the problem of state taxation, and indeed
it was argued by the Maryland attorneys. The contention of the state
counsel was that the argument that might sustain national government
taxation of state instrumentalities ought to justify similar exactions by
the states. Marshall emphatically rejected the contention. "But the two
cases," he insisted, "are not on the same reason."
The people of all the States have created the general govern-
ment, and have conferred upon it the general power of taxation.
The people of all the States, and the States themselves, are
represented in Congress, and, by their representatives, exercise
this power. When they tax the chartered institutions of the
States, they tax their constituents; and these taxes must be
uniform."
The situation he found to be different when the state taxed the operation
of the national government. Here "it acts upon institutions created,
not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claim no
control. It acts upon the measures of a government created by others
as well as themselves."5 Thus, the exactions of the state were exactions
at the expense of others.
The difference is that which always exists, and always must
exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and the action
of a part on the whole-between the laws of a government de-
clared to be supreme, and those of a government which, when
in opposition to those laws, is not supreme.6"
Thus Marshall leaves nothing to implication, but most definitely, clearly,
and concisely rejects the reciprocal nature of the immunity.
It was not until 1871 in Collector v. Day that the Court asserted
state immunity. Justice Nelson invoked the principles of sovereign
immunity explicated in McCulloch, and in Dobbins v. Erie County,"'
posing the question, "why are not those [instrumentalities] of the States
depending upon their reserved powers, for like reasons, equally exempt
58. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 435 (1819).
59. Ibid.
60. Id. at 435-36.
61. 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 435 (1842).
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from Federal taxation ? ' '62 The reply of Justice Bradley to Nelson's
question is essentially a precis of the arguments in McCulloch; Bradley's
dissent clearly reflects Marshall's position to a much greater extent than
the majority opinion in Collector v. Day.63  The majority ignored and
did not even attempt to answer the logic of Marshall's distinction be-
tween the two types of intergovernmental immunity. There can be no
historical justification for attributing to Marshall a doctrine which he
most emphatically denied.64
IV. THE MYTHICAL ISSUE OF THE LEGITIMACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In 1886 George Bancroft inaugurated the constitutional debate
over the power of judicial review with his polemical work against the
Legal Tender decision, 5 The Constitution of the United States Wounded
in the Home of its Guardians.6 Judicial review has since then been
continuously discussed in rather stark terms. With few exceptions the
tendency has been to regard the issue as monolithic, to assume that the
Founders either intended a plenary power of judicial nullification or
none at all. This tendency has multiplied error. A classic case in point
is the discussion by Beard in his The Court and the Constitution." There,
as Corwin has pointed out," Beard has assimilated statements made in
widely divergent times, in different contexts, on different aspects or
interpretations of judicial review, and has assumed that every statement
62. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 127 (1871).
63. Id. at 128-29. Even Johnston's dissent in McCulloch v. Maryland is far from
the doctrine of Collector v. Day, inasmuch as it implies congressional dominance and
the absence of state parity. Apparently Johnson would have allowed federal immunity
if Congress so provided. See MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON 249-51 (1954).
64. Mr. Rodell is also the source of another apparent myth, perhaps engendered
by his claimed virtue of not using such paraphernalia as note cards. In RODELL, Op. Cit.
supra note 55 at 238, he repeats the charge that Hughes switched his vote in deciding
United States v. Butler, 279 U.S. 1 (1936). "There is no longer any doubt, despite
the secrecy of Supreme Court conferences (the story has been told scores of times and
never denied) that Hughes both talked and voted for the AAA's validity until, unable
to win Roberts back to reason, he let himself be counted with the majority to make
the score 6-3." Yet Pusey, writing in 1951, four years previous, found the story "void
of substance." Pusey also points out that Brandeis had not made up his mind at con-
ference time which way to vote, and indeed vacillated to the end, making the 5-4 split
considerably less of a threat than usually assumed. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
743-45 (1951). A. T. Mason, certainly not ranked among Hughes' admirers, has
confirmed the picture drawn by Pusey with regard to Brandeis. Mason's study of
Stone's memoranda suggests that if any criticism lies against Hughes in the Butler
case it is for his determination to push the case through without adequate consideration
of the minority position. See MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW
414-16 (1956). It would seem the story has been both denied and disproven.
65. Legal Tender Caces, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
66. BANCROFT, A PLEA FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. OF AMERICA WOUNDED
IN THE HOUSE OF ITS GUARDIANS (1886).
67. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912).
68. May 1913 AM. Por.. Scr. REv. 329-32.
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can be treated in equivalent fashion as either positive or negative with
respect to judicial review.
Some commentators have persisted in taking out of context state-
ments made long after the constitutional convention, have assumed that
statements on judicial power over state legislation necessarily apply to
all possible usages of judicial review, and have extrapolated the rather
vague statements of the Constitution to cover problems not therein dealt
with. Others, perhaps even more peremptorily, have insisted that Mar-
shall's action in Marbury v. Madisoi69 constituted simply "a great
usurpation." However, a close examination of historical facts and
present-day protagonists, as well as the more subtle of our constitutional
commentators, suggests that the issue has been both exaggerated and
vulgarized; the true conflict was not over the power of the Court to
declare laws unconstitutional, but over the nature and extent of that
power.
Certainly it seems definite that the Framers intended judicial review
of state action. This is not provided for in the Constitution in haec
verba, but seems a necessary and obvious consequence of the provision
that "the judges in the several states shall be bound thereby. ' 7  Any
doubts on this question seem to be dispelled by the well-known provisions
of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 providing for Supreme Court
review of state court decisions, including those occasions when a state
court might declare a federal law unconstitutional.7 '
Some have argued that the implications of the Supremacy Clause
are equally clear with regard to congressional acts. It can be argued
that the degree of implicitness in the Constitution with regard to review
of congressional legislation is not appreciably different than with regard
to court action over state legislation. From this point of view, the
power to invalidate congressional acts can be found in the specific re-
striction that "acts of Congress in pursuance" of the Constitution are
alone supreme law of the land. One may question this position-the
"pursuance thereof" clause may well be a stylistic flourish, and this
cannot be the case with regard to the injunction to the state judges to
be bound by the Constitution; yet, there is more than some logic in the
denial that review on the state level is firmly and immutably distinguish-
able from other forms of judicial power to invalidate. Even in the
realm of the constitutional text, the argument for judicial review is by
69. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
70. U.S. CoNsT. art 6, 2d para.
71. See Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the
United States, 47 Am. L. REv. 1 (1913).
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no means an obviously specious one. Even to acknowledge this, however,
would not be to accept what many have previously thought a consequence.
Corwin has brilliantly shown that there existed many views of the nature
and limits of judicial power."' The argument for homogenization of
judicial review ignores the opinions shared at the time-there exists
historical record of clear and emphatic statements embracing and denying
virtually every possible variation of judicial review 7 -- and also ignores
changes in intellectual content that are the products of time and events.
It seems clear that the implications of such power were thought through
by few, if indeed by any. Hamilton's Federalist LXXVIII, for example,
is perennially cited in support of judicial review and reads like a first
draft of Marbury v. Madison ;"4 yet its precision disappears completely
in the context of Federalist XXCI, which argues that the powers of the
judiciary will not differ from those of the British courts, which by that
time did not even proffer the shadow of a claim of nullificatory power.
On the other hand, Jefferson clearly seems to have recognized the
right of judicial review over acts of Congress, but was vague as to the
consequences of such review. Where Jefferson was firm was in his
emphatic denial that the Court was to have the last word-to him, judi-
cial review did not imply judicial supremacy."2 On occasion Madison
showed greater realism by suggesting that the consequence of the Court's
peculiar role in the final steps of decision must result precisely in its
being the ultimate arbiter; but Madison was by no means consistent in
exploiting this insight."
This pattern of acknowledgment of some aspect of review without
full recognition of its consequences was not confined to the primary
figures of the day. The rather universal nature of such partial and
inchoate evaluations of the institution seems to be reflected in the sur-
prising confluence of judgment that is represented in the works of the
closest students of its evolution.
The locus classicus of the anti-Court argument is, of course, Louis
72. CoRwIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 26-33 (1937).
73. Warren, supra note 71.
74. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
75. See Krislov, Jefferson and Judicial Review: Refereeing Cahn, Commager
and Mendelson, 9 J. Pus. L. 374 (1960), and the ensuing discussion with Mendelson:
Mendelson, Jefferson and Judicial Reviezw-A Reply to Professor Krislov, 10 J. PUB. L.
113 (1961), and Krislov, The Alleged Inconsistency: A Revised Version, 10 J. PuB. L.
117 (1961). Compare Corwin, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Acts of Con-
gress, 4 MIcH. L. REv. 616, 629 (1906).
76. See Madison, probably October 1788, 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 294
(Hunt ed. 1910). "It results to them by refusing or not refusing to execute a law, to
stamp it with its final character. This makes the Judiciary Department paramount
in fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and can never be proper."
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Boudin's two-volume Government by Judiciary." Boudin takes great
pains in his preface to disassociate himself from the charge of usurpa-
tion. "The term 'usurpation,'" he writes, "has never been used by the
author in this book as his own characterization of the assumption of
power involved."" At a number of points in the work he elucidates the
distinction between several possible variations of judicial nullification-
particularly to defend their own prerogatives-and the ultimate power
of judicial supremacy. On occasion he comes so close to overtly endors-
ing some of the milder forms of review that his legio-Marxian rhetoric
barely obscures this. In later writings he was to argue that judicial
review with regard to Bill of Rights provisions was intended and was
defensible."s
A more conventional yet more subtle treatment is to be found in
Robert McCloskey's Essays in Contstitutional Law.81 Following Corwin
in his criticism of Beard's The Court and the Constitution, McCloskey
asks "a more sophisticated and thus more difficult question than the
one posed by Beard," and attempts to deal with the problem of the type
of review. "Suppose, for example," McCloskey suggests, "we ask what
was the scope of the judicial review which the framers had in mind, i.e.,
did they think of the courts as being empowered to overrule Congress
in all cases that raised any constitutional question or did they see the
power as applying only when direct constitutional prohibitions were
transgressed? '"s2 He goes on to pose another problem:
Suppose, for another example, we ask what conception the
framers had of the finality of the court's judgments on mat-
77. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY (1932).
78. Id. at iii. Compare Holmes, in Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927):
"Although research has shown and practice has established the futility of the charge
that it was a usurpation when this Court undertook to declare an act of Congress un-
constitutional." Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Sanford concurred in this opinion.
79. BOUDIN, op. cit. supra note 77, e.g., p. 182: "One may very well admit that Con-
gress has no right to impose upon the courts non-judicial duties, and when it attempts to
do so the courts have a right to refuse to act, without at all admitting the power of
the judiciary to declare a general law unconstitutional"; p. 98, where Boudin dis-
tinguishes between refusal to enforce laws manifestly unconstitutional and instances
where the unconstitutionality has to be inferred; and pp. 99-101 and 574, where Boudin
discusses the Jeffersonian theory of the right of each branch to decide unconstitu-
tionality for itself.
The truth of the matter is that GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY is a lawyer's brief, with
many alternative pleas and arguments, making it difficult to ascertain Boudin's precise
views. Yet the care with which he disentangles himself from the usurpation charge
suggests a realization that it is the usage and the particular form of judicial review
that is vulnerable, rather than the institution in toto.
80. See Boudin, Majority Rule and Constitutional Interpretation, 4 LAW GUILD
REV. 1, 4 (March-April 1944).
81. MCCLOSKEY, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20 ff. (1957).
82. Id. at 22.
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ters of constitutionality, i.e., whether they thought of Supreme
Court decisions as binding all other departments of govern-
ment, or only the judiciary? On both these questions . .. the
founding fathers had only the dimmest of notions.8"
When we ask this type of question, which McCloskey rightly suggests
is the real one, the evidence becomes thinner, and the conclusion that
there was an absence of full anticipation of the consequences becomes
surer.
The generally unorthodox findings of W. W. Crosskey are on close
examination amazingly similar to these rather divergent approaches.
The critical book review by Rossiter of Crosskey's Politics and the
Constitution" has appropriately found Crosskey's treatment of Court
power by far the outstanding portion of his controversial reassessment
of the intent of the Framers. Crosskey's conclusions on the power of
the Court are essentially that:
[J]udicial review was not meant to be provided generally in
the Constitution, as to acts of Congress, though it was meant
to be provided generally as to the acts of the states, and a
limited right likewise was intended to be given to the Court,
even as against Congress, to preserve its own judiciary pre-
rogatives intact.8"
There is, according to him, a power to nullify state action and a "sep-
aration of powers-checks and balances" notion that the Court might
utilize review essentially for self-protection. In no sense, however, was
Court decision to be final or its nullificatory powers catholic in nature.
The surprising consensus developed by these authorities is that
judicial review was fundamentally an emergent, in Whitehead's terms,
in that it took on additional dimensions and scope with the passage of
time from an original core of authentic power. Alone among current
authorities in a total denial of the legitimacy of any review, Henry Steele
Commager's Majority Rule and Minority Rights," is basically an eva-
sive and contradictory effort." It is in the area of delimiting the
Framers' intended fundamental core of judicial review that scholars
tend to disagree, both as to the field of endeavor and the finality of
judicial decision.
83. Ibid.
84. 16 REv. or POLITICS 237, 241 (1954).
85. 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1007(1953).
86. COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3 (1943).
87. Boudin, supra note 80; and Krislov, supra note 68.
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A more defensible extreme position has been developed by Hart
and Wechsler, who have embraced judicial review in toto. "Despite
the curiously persisting myth of usurpation," they comment, "the Con-
vention's understanding on this point emerges from its record with
singular clarity.""8  Basically, these authors are forced to assert this
more by fiat than by evidence. They point to what they regard as
"conclusive" demonstrations in Warren, Farrand and Beard, which they
assert "should have put an end to the discussion."89  They attribute to
the intellectual climate of the twenties and thirties a bias which "appears
to have paralyzed the capacity of large numbers of political scientists
and historians to appraise evidence or avow conclusions."9  To support
this indictment of ideological blindness they suggest comparing "the
trenchancy of Beard's 1912 book" with his neutral statements in 1927
and his portrait of judicial review as a defense of property owners in
1930.
Curiously, Hart and Wechsler indict political scientists and his-
torians for alleged former misdeeds, but give no indication of the extent
to which they have considered and rejected the more sophisticated argu-
ments, largely devoid of older ideological content, which these profes-
sions have developed in recent years. Without some further examination
of the historical data, and a closer analysis than is presented by the
authorities they cite in support of their argument, it would appear that
Hart and Wechsler's largely ad hominem argument must remain suspect.
Wechsler has individually given us a closer view of his position"'
in a reply to Learned Hand's The Bill of Rights.2 Hand has argued
that the Constitution merely provides for review of state laws, and that
the principle of expressio unius exchsio alterius ought to exclude review
of Congressional action. The latter, he finds, is based upon necessity,
rather than the constitutional document itself.93 Wechsler sharply chal-
lenges this, arguing that logic would dictate a complete system of judi-
cial review-that is, if state judges are to rule on the constitutionality
of Congressional acts then so must federal judges. 4 Wechsler's argu-
ment is a cogent one, and closely reasoned. However, it is hard to accept
88. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 14
(1953).
89. Id. at 14-15, n.34.
90. Ibid.
91. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REXV.
1, 2 (1959). "I have not the slightest doubt respecting the legitimacy of judicial review."
92. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
93. Id., esp. at 5-6.
94. It is also interesting to note that Wechsler does not attempt to distinguish
between forms and degrees of finality of judicial review even in this elucidation of
his position.
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the arguments that a pattern of governmental institutions must have
been intended merely because such a pattern seems today more logical
than its alternatives; there is a threshold of minimum historical evidence
which every historically oriented writer must reach.
Indeed, the argument for an illogical, unplanned, emergent, ill-
understood concept of judicial review seems much more convincing.
There is almost an historical presumption against rigorous, logical con-
sistency in a collective intent in the creation of a full-blown human insti-
tution. Agreement on a broad pattern of expected human behavior by
a large body of discreet individuals who are torn by a multiplicity of
perceptions is, quite simply, a rare phenomenon. More important than
this broad overgeneralization is the ample evidence we have buttressing
a judgment of lack of agreement on the content of judicial review in
congressional debates and polemical discussion." These theories ranged
far afield with multiple interpretations of the phenomena and there are
few outbursts in the early period of genuine indignation on the part of
proponents of judicial review-the kind of indignation associated with
perception of a denial of a consensually and universally accepted institu-
tional expectation. The discussions at the ratifying conventions, even at
the Convention itself, the letters of the Framers, court decisions, Marburv
v. Madison itself, all bear the stamp of tentativeness of statement asso-
ciated with an emerging rather than an established pattern.
Thus the argument for a full-scale system of judicial review and
judicial supremacy seems to rest upon merely excogitated legal arguments
rather than on a sound critical historical basis. While such arguments
are of great moment and worthy of respect vis-a-vis the question of
functional desirability and necessity, they cannot serve to dismiss the
problem of legitimacy and intent. For those who regard the question
of historical intent as a valid one, logical arguments alone cannot suffice.
It is between these two positions that modern scholarship must
choose. Simple usurpation can be rejected out of hand. The argument
of fulblown creation and legitimacy has not been demolished, but is in
any case very shaky. It seems safest to say that judicial review in its
present day form was an innovation and a product of an on-going demo-
cratic society.
CONCLUSION
The underlying theme uniting these diverse misconceptions is their
amazing persistence. Commonly born in strife, they are the product of
95. The demonstration of this is the finest by-product of Warren, supra note 71.
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an ideological position, a rationalization of existing conditions or past
history. As such, their origins are easily understood.
Their persistence, however, goes beyond this function, and the mere
avoidance of a commitment has not necessarily led to escape from error.
There is little vested interest, for example, in the position that Marshall
was responsible for reciprocal tax immunities. Similarly, even so-called
"'neutrals" on the issue of judicial review are precisely the ones who
have misunderstood the position of the primary protagonists. Perhaps
this is not actually as surprising as it seems on the surface. One must
realize that, in a deeper sense, even one who is not engaged has, in fact,
.an ideological position and a world view that accompanies it. All our
lives we have been not only talking prose without knowing it, but living
out a Weltanzschauung without awareness as well.
The evidence is not as dismaying as it appears at first sight. Scholars
have been misled into serious error, and have avoided appreciation of
truth even when the facts were readily available; but there have always
been scholars of note and of conviction who have retained a respect for
facts. It has not been the quality of conviction or enthusiasm that has
distinguished between those who could successfully reproduce the past
and those who could not. In contradiction to his views on historical
method, it is curious to note that Charles Beard retained an ability to
distinguish between his wishes with regard to the historical record and
the events as they occurred. In fact, the critics of Charles Beard have
usually been able to build a case by merely reading his works rather
closely. The fact that so violent a critic as Louis Boudin was careful
to modify his case to avoid overstatement is instructive, though most
readers have avoided noting the qualifications. From even this scattered
data, drawn from the very vortex of error, there is substantial evidence
for objectivity malgr' lui. The reign of misconceptions is a discourag-
ing fact, and the temporal durability of such misconceptions is awesome.
Yet the record also bears out and inspires respect for the objective scho-
larship of a select number of first-rate scholars.
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